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I. A DEFINITION FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Papers today from scholars and prominent high court judges reflect enormous
breadth in describing judicial independence. I believe that if one begins to talk about
the effect of "judicial independence" on economic development, there should be an
agreement on the definition of that term. It is not clear to me that the papers contain
such a definition. They do state a number of factors that people think are relevant
to judicial independence. It seems that two kinds of definitions may have
emerged: an institutional-type definition, and a performance-based definition.
A. Institutional-type Definition of Judicial Independence
One definition of judicial independence may be referred to as an institutional
definition: a judge's immunity from external pressures. This is the position that is
taken in Daniel Klerman and Paul Mahoney's article. In brief, the article states:
A fully independent judiciary is one in which judges enjoy tenure during
good behavior, a salary sufficient to shield them from pressure from
either government or private parties, sufficient prestige that the hope of
promotion to a more prominent post is not a large motivator, a system of
perquisites.., that is hard for the government to manipulate, and rules
regarding jurisdiction over cases that are resistant to executive and
legislative meddling, among others.'
Today's papers embrace aspects of this definition of judicial independence.
Professor Klerman also referred to the definition of judicial independence
proffered by Feld and Voight as "the amount of discretion that judges have at
their disposal vis-a-vis representatives of other government branches."2 This
definition emphasizes the horizontal separation of powers among coordinate
branches of government.
* Professor of Law, University of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. B.A., J.D., University of
California, Berkeley.
1. See Daniel M. Klerman & Paul G. Mahoney, The Value of Judicial Independence: Evidence from
Eighteenth Century England, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2-3 (2005).
2. See Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, Economic Growth and Judicial Independence: Cross Country
Evidence Using a New Set of Indicators (CESifo Working Papers No. 906 at 3, 2003), available at
http//ssm.com/absratct=395403.
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Both Justice Jing Liu and Deputy President Sam Rugege have raised the
question of how the tradition of coordination in their countries relates to judicial
independence.
In addition, Wang Juan has raised another structural or institutional type of
issue, namely independence within the judicial system, or what might be called
vertical independence. What implications arise when a lower court seeks advice
from a higher court? That seems to be an interference with judicial independence.
But to some extent, does it depend on whether systemic independence or
individual judges is at issue? The papers seemed mixed on this point-some talk
about a system of judicial independence, and others talk about how individual
judges act. Certainly, a lower court judge who is seeking advice from a higher
court is not going to feel independent after receiving that advice. But, does that
mean the system is not one of judicial independence?
Another structural issue pinpointed by Judge Callahan concerned the U.S.
Supreme Court's review of Marbury v. Madison;3 so, when judicial independence
is discussed in this country, this entails the independence to decide the
constitutionality of controversial issues. Cases like McCullough v. Maryland and
Dred Scott v. Sandford' were certainly controversial, and judges were vetted for
how they felt about those cases during their judicial confirmation. But, how does
the very political nature of the appointment and confirmation process in the
United States affect the notion of judicial independence?
B. Performance-based Definition of Judicial Independence
The other kind of definition of judicial independence is a performance-based
meaning: judicial independence is a function of a judge's behavior. The judicial
system seeks judges who act neutral and base their actions on law and facts.
There seems to be wide agreement with that proposition in the abstract.
Relatedly, the judicial system also seeks predictability. Intuitively, one would
think that economic actors would be more interested in predictability than any
other aspect of judicial independence.
The one thing that the participants of the symposium 6 seemed to agree on
was that judicial independence does not mean freedom from all accountability.
Justices Liu and Rugege mentioned the importance of having a code of ethics.
Judge Callahan referred to this as internal accountability.
There are also a number of ways that the judicial system, as a whole, is held
accountable. The power of the purse has been mentioned. For example, if the
public shows disapproval of a judge's behavior, a number of repercussions may
3. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
5. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
6. Symposium, Judicial Independence and Legal Infrastructure: Essential Partners for Economic
Development at the McGeorge School of Law (October 28, 2005).
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result, such as freezing a judge's salary, reducing a judge's support staff, or
limiting the number of judicial positions, which may create jams in the court
system. Consequently, a lot can be done to make life miserable for judges.
Another way of determining what is meant by judicial independence is to ask
why such independence is wanted, and see if a definition comes from that
direction. Once that question is answered, the definition of judicial independence
should be ascertained.
II. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMICS, PREDICTABILITY,
AND NEUTRALITY
Do economic actors want neutrality, or would they be satisfied with
predictability? Once matters have deteriorated to the point that parties have to go
to court, every economic actor wants the court to rule in its favor more than it
wants neutrality. While predictability may help economic actors make rational
investment decisions, anti-investment courts would discourage, rather than
encourage, some economic activity. So perhaps predictability and neutrality are
linked to the definition of judicial independence. If judges really are neutral, then
litigants should be able to look at the law and facts, and predict the outcome of a
case in advance and should not have to go to court. They ought to be able to
settle a case.
For many years, I worked in enforcement of the federal civil rights laws in
the deep South, and I could certainly predict what some judges were going to do;
it was not pretty. Many judges were predictable. They would virtually always
rule against the person seeking vindication of the right to be free from
discrimination. Even though they were predictable, these judges certainly were
not neutral. It is worth noting that prior to the 1970s, the deep South was at the
bottom of the economic rung in this country. The economy of that region has
improved markedly since then. Is this improvement possibly linked in part to the
fact that the end of the segregation era has freed judges to become more
independent?
Deputy President Rugege underscored a very important point about the
economic issue that confronts underpaid judges. The American Bar Association
Journal published a story a few years ago about a U.S. federal judge who went to
Cambodia to lecture on corruption. He went to a provincial court to discuss how
terrible corruption was. After he finished his talk, one of the provincial judges
raised his hand and asked the judge his salary, and the federal judge told him.
U.S. federal judges make a living wage with pretty good perks and the federal
judiciary attracts very highly-qualified candidates. By contrast, the Cambodian
provincial judge said he could not feed his family on his salary. It is important to
stress that there will be no judicial independence as long as judges have to
determine how to support their family. The answer, of course, is pretty clear. If
these judges are not getting paid by the state, they are going to get their money
elsewhere. Anyone would do that for his or her family.
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It is also predictable that a judge whose decision depends upon the good
graces of the government is going to rule in favor of those who are in power.
Perhaps in thinking about judicial independence and economic development, the
analysis should split between cases involving the government and cases between
private actors. It seems conceivable that even in a system where the courts are
not independent vis-a-vis the government, they could be independent vis-a-vis
private actors. That is, the government may, in order to promote economic
development, wish to have most economic development cases decided neutrally.
At the same time, however, the government may wish to maintain tighter
control over other types of cases. For example, in times of crisis, all governments
are prone to impose stricter controls on human behavior and even seek judicial
cooperation in doing so. Additionally in one-party states, the party will want the
courts to help stamp out challenges to its hegemony. This was the case, for
example, in the deep South through the middle of the twentieth century. There
are many signs that this is the case in modern China. Conversely, one might
argue that a court is either independent or not, and there is no in-between.
A court system may be also neutral without being entirely predictable.
Predictability depends in part on a system of precedent. If a court decides each case
without reference to what has happened in other courts or cases, predictability
suffers. Predictability also requires a measure of judicial competence. Incompetent
judges are unlikely to be up to the task of fully understanding the facts and the law
(even in simple cases), and certainly are not capable of unraveling complex
economic transnational issues.
What is meant by neutrality? Here, one might turn to a set of principles from
the United Nations. The Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of
Crime and the Treatment of Defenders adopted three basic principles regarding
the independence of the judiciary, which were endorsed by the General Assembly
in 1985 in two different resolutions. The first basic principle says that "[t]he
independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the state and enshrined in
the constitution or the law of the country. 7 I gather that this is the case in most
countries. That is what Judge Rugege referred to as de jure independence. The
next basic principle declares: "The judiciary shall decide matters before them
impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any
restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences,
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason."' Moreover, the third
principle states that "[t]he judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a
judicial nature and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue
submitted for its decision is within its competence as defined by law."9
7. See e.g., Joseph Kahn, When Chinese Sue the State, Cases Are Often Smothered, NY TIMES, Dec. 28,
2005 at Al.
8. Id.
9. Id.
Global Business & Development Law Journal / Vol. 19
Note that these principles not only apply to structure, but also to what courts
actually do-they must act impartially. These principles require courts to have
jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature. In the United States, the executive
or legislative branch has attempted to remove some matters from the jurisdiction
of the judiciary. In China, issues concerning the constitutionality of statutes are
not decided by the courts; they are decided by the Council of the People's
Congress. These issues are not supposed to be decided by the courts. Does that
mean that there is no judicial independence? Not necessarily. Courts may be
independent enough to decide other issues even if they are not independent as to
those issues. The jurisdiction of independent courts over the constitutionality of
government action seems central to the concept of the rule of law. So the
question is whether there can be judicial independence without rule of law.
One final point emerges from Judge Callahan's remarks: the distinction
between judicial independence and a lack of accountability. Judges are, at the
very least, accountable to the law. As Justice Cardozo explained, "[tihe judge,
even when he is free, is still not wholly free."' ° A judge must internalize the
traditions of proper adjudication. Accountability to the law presupposes
transparency, which promotes both neutrality and predictability. Lower courts are
also accountable to appellate courts. An independent judiciary may include layers
of appellate review that take away the independence of lower court judges.
Electoral accountability is more problematic. Can it be said that a judge whose
ability to be re-elected depends on how she rules on a controversial issue is
independent?
III. CONCLUSION
In short, judicial independence can be generally defined in terms of
freedom-indeed responsibility-to rule based on the facts and the law, and thus
free from undue external restraints. This definition of judicial independence can
accommodate both common law and civil law traditions. But within that
definition lurks many ambiguities. As scholars seek to determine the link, if any,
between judicial independence and economic development, they need first to
develop a solid definition of judicial independence. The papers delivered at this
conference provide a solid base for doing so.
10. See BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (Yale University Press
1921).

